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 CHAPTER TWO 
 
DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE, AND 
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT 
 
 
Carmelo V. Sison* 
 
 
Introduction 
 The 1987 Philippine Constitution declares in its Declaration of Principles and State 
Policies that the Philippines is a democratic and republican state (CONST, art. II, sec. 1). 
Constitutionally, the Philippines is a state where government is republican in form, in the 
sense of American constitutionalism. Its meaning is that expressed by James Madison: 
 
 We may define a republic to be a government which derives all its power 
directly or indirectly from the great body of people; and is administered by persons 
holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behaviour. 
It is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the 
society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favorable class of it. It is 
sufficient for such a government that the person administering it be appointed either 
directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either 
of the tenures just specified (J. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the 
Philippines: A Commentary, p. 52 [1996]). 
 
Further, the Philippines under the 1987 Constitution is not just a representative 
government but also shares some aspects of direct democracy, as the “initiative and 
referendum under Art. VI, Sec. 3. As a representative government is a defining 
characteristic of the state, the innovations in the  1987 Constitution on the three branches of 
government as will be discussed in this paper ensure that it remains democratic. 
 
 
I. The Legislative Department 
It is often argued that the existence of democracy is gauged by the presence or  
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 absence of a legislature. This is so as Congress – among other state agencies – is the 
most predisposed towards democratic rule. Naturally, it would be the first body that 
autocratic rulers undermine or dismantle to advance their authoritarian agenda (R. S. 
Velasco, “Does Philippine Congress Promote Democracy?” in F. Miranda, ed., 
Democratization: Philippine Perspectives, p. 281 [1997]). 
 
 In 1972, one of the first acts of then President Marcos after the proclamation of 
martial law was the dissolution of Congress and the padlocking of the legislative building 
to prevent members of Congress from convening in session. Even the interim National 
Assembly, provided for in the 1973 Constitution in its transitory provision (Sec. 1 of 
Article XVII), was not convened by the President-Prime Minister. It was only in virtue of 
the 1981 amendments, or 9 years later, that an interim Batasan Pambansa was called into 
being. And yet even with this transitional legislature, the martial law regime saw to it that 
the Executive had superior legislative powers, such that it could override enactments made 
by the Batasan. Operationally, the IBP powers were curtailed such that: 
 
1. it could not pass a vote of no confidence in the government and so bring it down; 
2. it could not repeal any of the decrees that the President had promulgated in recent 
years; 
3. except for bills of local application, it could only consider bills that were 
recommended by the Cabinet; and 
4. for any bills that the IBP failed to pass, the President could issue any measures (A. 
Catilo and P. Tapales, “The Legislature” in R. de Guzman and M. Reforma, (eds.)  
Government and Politics of the Philippines, pp. 151-2 [1988]). 
 
 The legislature as a barometer and an enabler of democracy traces its philosophical 
and rational underpinnings from the anti-absolutist and liberal ideas of Western thinkers, 
notably Locke, Voltaire and Rousseau. These thinkers assailed the despotic and non-
accountable aristocracy as the recurring cause of abuse and unrest in Western Europe. They 
argued for an alternative structure allowing greater public participation in decision-making 
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 so as to stop decay and restore order. The participatory regime called for an elective 
legislature or parliament where the citizens would cease to be mere recipients and followers 
of laws emanating from the king and the aristocracy and they were instead given power to 
either support or challenge existing laws or policies through their representatives (Ibid). 
 
With this in mind, the 1987 Philippine Constitution introduced several changes 
intended to make Congress a more representative body accountable to the people and to 
strengthen it vis-à-vis the President as a reaction to the abuse of presidential power under 
former President Marcos. Legislators exercise collective and individual powers as they 
shape policy, raise revenues to support essential government services and appropriate funds 
in cooperation, competition and bargaining with the President. They often make use of their 
investigative power, their access to the media, and their patronage and funds for 
infrastructure (J. Abueva, “Philippine Democratization and the Consolidation of 
Democracy Since the 1986 EDSA Revolution: An Overview of the Main Issues, Trends 
and Prospects” in F. Miranda, ed., supra, pp. 1-81 at pp. 33-4). 
 
The 1973 Constitution formally changed the presidential system of government 
under the 1935 Constitution to a modified parliamentary system. The bicameral Congress 
became a unicameral parliament in the Batasan Pambansa. In the presidential system before, 
a two party system, composed of the majority party (the party obtaining the largest number 
of votes) and the minority party (the party obtaining the second largest number of votes in 
the last elections) was formerly recognized in the Constitution, particularly in the 
composition of the Commission on Appointments and the Electoral Tribunals in both 
Houses. Representation in Congress became a monopoly of the two parties. With the 1973 
Constitution introducing a parliamentary system, a multi-party system came into being. 
During martial rule (1972-1981) however, notwithstanding the formal provisions of the 
Constitution creating a representative legislature, the operative code was embodied in 
decrees issued by a dictatorship euphemistically called constitutional authoritarianism. 
 The 1987 Constitution reintroduced the bicameral body under a presidential system 
of government akin to the US Congress after the experiment with unicameralism under the 
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 1973 Constitution (CONST. [1973] art. VIII, secs 1 & 2). The Congress is composed of a 
250-member (where 20% thereof, or 50 members, shall be elected by means of the party-
list system) House of Representatives as the Lower House and the 24-member Senate as the 
Upper House (CONST, art. VI, secs. 1, 2, 5(1)). Bicameralism was favored because it is 
believed that (1) an upper house is a body that looks at problems from the national 
perspective and thus serves as a check on the parochial tendency of a body elected by 
districts, (2) bicameralism allows for a more careful study of legislation, and (3) 
bicameralism is less vulnerable to attempts of the executive to control the legislature (The 
debates over unicameralism and bicameralism are found in II Record of the Constitutional 
Commission, pp. 47-69 as cited in J. Bernas, supra, p. 601). 
 
 Congress as the repository of the people’s sovereignty and bulwark of 
representative democracy under the 1987 Constitution is best shown in the fact that Article 
VI of the Constitution providing for the roles, structures and powers of Congress precedes 
the two other co-equal government branches – the executive, under Article VII, and the 
judiciary, under Article VIII. The provisions on Congress also cover the longest portion of 
the Constitution with 32 sections (R. Velasco, supra at note 1, p. 285). 
 
Among the other major changes in the 1987 Constitution on the legislative branch 
was the introduction of the party-list system so as to encourage the growth of a multi-party 
system (J. Bernas, supra, p. 628). The party-list representatives constitute twenty per 
centum of the total number of representatives including the party-list (CONSTI, art. VI, sec. 
5(1)). For the first three consecutive terms after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution 
(the 1987 Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987 as held by the Supreme Court in 
De Leon vs. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602 [1987]), one-half of the seats allocated to party-list 
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, 
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other 
sectors as may be provided be law, except the religious sector (CONST. art. VI, sec. 5(2)). 
As provided in Section 2 of the Party-list System Act (R.A. 7941, March 3, 1995), the 
party-list system is to promote proportional representation in the election of representatives 
 4
 to the House of Representatives which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to 
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment 
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the 
House of Representatives.  
 
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held 
simultaneously with the national elections. One hundred twenty-three (123) parties, 
organizations and coalitions participated. However pursuant to the two percent (2%) rule in 
Republic Act No. 7941 and Resolution No. 2847, “Rules and Regulations Governing the 
Election of xxx Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System” issued by the 
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on June 25, 1996, only 14 of the 52 allotted seats 
for party-list actually won. The COMELEC en banc decided that the twenty percent 
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives should be filled 
up. This ruling was challenged before the Supreme Court after the COMELEC proclaimed 
38 other party-list representatives despite the latter not mustering the required number of 
votes. The Supreme Court invalidated the proclamation of the 38 party-list representatives, 
holding that Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory but merely 
provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress and that allowing the latter to fill-up the 
party-list seats would be a glaring violation of the two percent threshold requirement of 
R.A. No. 7941 (Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244 [2000]). The 
Court, noting the low turnout of the first party-list elections, however said: 
 
 The low turn-out of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be 
interpreted as a total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of 
representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication that the 
requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the 
system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in 
parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should 
allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of 
our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants 
should not despair. 
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  Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list 
representatives should serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. 
It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign for 
representation in the State’s lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call 
for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy. 
 
 With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral 
parties, we are confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list 
elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized 
sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress 
under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style (Ibid).   
   
 
The multi-party system adopted in the 1987 Constitution would determine the 
membership of two bodies created by the Constitution, namely the Commission on 
Appointments, which operates to check the exercise of the appointing power of the 
President, and the Electoral Tribunals in both Houses which decide election contests 
involving their respective members. The members of Congress in these bodies shall be 
elected by each House on the basis of the proportional representation from the political 
parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented 
therein (CONSTI, art. VI, secs. 17 & 18). 
 
Another new provision intended to ensure and maintain the fiduciary nature of the 
position of member of Congress and their fidelity to the public trust given to them is the 
requirement of disclosure of financial and business interests (I. Cruz, Philippine Political 
Law, pp. 117-8 [1995]). Section 12 of Article VI provides that: 
 
All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon 
assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. 
They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may 
arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors. 
  
This provision requiring the members of Congress to make known at the outset their 
financial and business connections or investments hopes to reduce the potential for self-
aggrandizement by the members of Congress and to prevent them from using their official 
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 positions for ulterior purposes (Ibid). However, this does not mean that the legislator cannot 
file the proposed legislation. It merely enables Congress to examine arguments presented 
with a sharper eye and in the context of the personal interest involved. The advance 
disclosure would create a presumption in favor of the legislator concerned should the 
legislator be later charged by his colleagues with conflict of interest (II RECORD OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, pp. 165-8 cited in J. Bernas, supra at p. 646). 
 
 Although the members of Congress are more visible and appreciated by their 
constituencies for their patronage and pork barrel and “country-wide development fund” 
(CDF) in support of infrastructure construction (J. Abueva, supra, p. 34), these funds 
appropriated for the legislative districts are supposed to be earmarked for specific public 
works projects. Moreover, to obviate illegal expenditures of public funds, discretionary 
funds shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers 
and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law (CONST. art. VI, sec. 25(6)). 
This new provision is intended to prevent abuse in the use of discretionary funds (J. Bernas, 
supra, p. 690). This came about because in many cases, discretionary funds were spent for 
personal purposes, to the prejudice and often without even the knowledge of the public (I. 
Cruz, supra, p. 160). Finally, so that the people may know how members of Congress spent 
the amounts appropriated for them, the 1987 Constitution requires that the records and 
books of accounts shall be preserved and be open to the public and the books shall be 
audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of 
amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each member (CONST, art. VI, sec. 20). 
 
 In the 1987 Constitution the electorate now share with the Congress legislative 
powers. Art. VI, sec. 1 states that: 
 
 “The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which 
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent 
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum” (emphasis 
supplied). 
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 With the legislative power conferred directly on the people by the provision on 
initiative and referendum, Section 32 of Article VI mandates Congress, as early as possible, 
to provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby 
the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part 
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition 
therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which 
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered 
voters thereof. To this end, Congress has enacted the implementing law Republic Act No. 
6735 (August 4, 1989) entitled “An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and 
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor” (otherwise known as “The Initiative and 
Referendum Act”). 
 
Under the law, an Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to 
the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an election called for the 
purpose under three (3) systems: 
 
1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to 
the Constitution; 
2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national 
legislation; and 
3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a 
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance (sec. 
3(a)). 
 
An indirect initiative is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition 
sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action (sec. 3(b)).  
On the other hand, a referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a 
legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:  
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 1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, 
or part thereof, passed by Congress; and  
2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, 
resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies 
(sec. 3 (c)). 
 
 However, in spite of this enabling law, the Supreme Court decided in Santiago v. 
COMELEC (270 SCRA 106 [1997]) that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or 
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the 
Constitution is concerned (supra at p. 153). Thus, while R.A. No. 6735 is the current 
enabling law for Section 32 of Article VI insofar as both national and local initiative and 
referendum are concerned, it is not an adequate enabling law for the people’s right of 
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution as found in Article XVII, Section 2. 
Said section provides that: 
 
“Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the 
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total 
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented 
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under 
this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this 
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. 
 
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this 
right.” (emphasis supplied) 
 
 
II. The Executive Department 
Unlike that for the legislative and judicial branches where the powers are vested in 
groups of persons: the Congress and the Supreme Court and other inferior courts 
respectively, Article VII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, in returning to the presidential 
model of the 1935 Constitution, gives the executive power to just one person, the President 
of the Philippines (M. Manuel, “Philippine Government and its Separation and 
Coordination of Powers” in Politics and Governance: Theory and Practice in the Philippine 
 9
 Context, pp. 77-116 at p. 93 [1999]). Executive power is briefly described as the power to 
enforce and administer the laws, but it is actually more than this. Plenary executive power 
vested to the President assumes a plenitude of authority, and corresponding awesome 
responsibility, making the President the most influential person in the land (I. Cruz, supra 
at p. 173). This broad executive power is even enlarged by the ruling of the Supreme Court 
in the case of Marcos v. Manglapus (177 SCRA 668 [1989]), where it declared that 
President Aquino had authority to prevent the return of the Marcoses even in the absence of 
a law expressly granting her such authority. It was held that the President has residual 
powers not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. Speaking through Justice Irene 
Cortes, the Court said: 
 
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power 
to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government 
and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the 
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the 
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the 
President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, 
e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations. 
 
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution 
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains 
intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." 
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the 
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is 
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. 
 
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is 
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark decision of 
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on the issue 
of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines and the Legislature may 
vote the shares of stock held by the Government to elect directors in the National 
Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
upholding the power of the Governor-General to do so, said: 
 
. . . Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the 
"board" and "committee" respectively, are not charged with the performance of 
any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of 
performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the 
moment the question whether the duties devolved upon these members are 
vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not 
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 legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact 
that they do not fall within the authority of either of these two constitutes logical 
ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining one among 
which the powers of government are divided . . . [At 202-203; emphasis 
supplied.] 
 
 The Court even emphasized the above ruling in a per curiam resolution on a motion 
for reconsideration (178 SCRA 760 [1989]): 
 
Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom 
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the 
grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties 
under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are 
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered 
provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the 
members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the 
President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result 
was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the 
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive 
power. 
 
That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the 
Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from 
which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers among three (3) 
separate branches. 
 
 Nonetheless, owing to the conviction that former President Marcos had exercised 
the executive power beyond  allowable  limits,  the  1987  Constitution  had placed more 
structural limitations to the specific powers granted to the President – to appoint, to ensure 
faithful execution of the laws, to be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, to grant 
clemency, and to contract foreign loans (J. Bernas, supra at p. 731). 
 
 Foremost among the new limitations on the President is the term limit imposed by 
Section 4 of Article VII. This stemmed from the presidential abuses committed by the 
Marcos during his 20-year reign. The 1987 Constitution provides that the term of office of 
the President is six years and that the President is ineligible for any reelection. The 
Constitutional Commission believed that six years was long enough for a good President to 
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 implement his programs and, rather optimistically, that with the constraints built around the 
presidency, a bad one would not succeed in accomplishing his evil design. The elimination 
of the prospect of reelection is believed to make a more independent President capable of 
making correct even if unpopular decisions (Ibid at pp. 742-3). 
 
 There was a debate on the applicability of the six-year term limit to President 
Aquino. One interpretation was that the limit did not apply to her as she became President 
before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. To her credit though, she resisted the chance 
of seeking another term in 1992, in scrupulous observance of the term limit (J. Abueva, 
supra at p. 30). 
 
 A move to amend the Constitution by way of people’s initiative resulted in a 
controversy in 1997 (the PIRMA case) when the People’s Initiative for Reforms, 
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) filed with the Commission on Elections a "Petition to 
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative", 
seeking, among others, to lift the term limit of the presidency. As stated earlier, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the basis for the people’s initiative, R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, 
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on 
amendments to the Constitution is concerned (Santiago v. COMELEC, supra). Thus, the 
move to lift the term limit of the President was stalled. 
 
 The rules on disclosure of illness in case of incapacity by the President as contained 
in Sections 11 and 12 of Article VII were originally statutory (Batas Blg. 231 (1982) 
entitled: “An Act to Implement the Constitutional Provisions on Presidential Succession, 
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes”) but now transferred to the 
Constitution (I. Cruz, supra at p. 181). The rules provide: 
 
SECTION 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office and until he transmits to 
them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be 
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President. 
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Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President 
of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written 
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the 
office as Acting President. 
 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability 
exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a 
majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the 
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their 
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall 
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules 
and without need of call. 
 
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if 
not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a 
two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as the 
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties 
of his office. 
 
 
SECTION 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be 
informed of the state of his health. The Members of the Cabinet in charge of 
national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President during such illness. 
 
 Section 11 deals with incapacity to perform the functions of the Presidency while 
Section 12 presumably deals with serious illness not incapacitating because access to him is 
not denied to cabinet members in charge of the national security and foreign relations. The 
access is to allow the President to make the important decisions in those areas of 
government suggesting a situation where the President is still able. The purpose of the right 
of the public to be informed of the state of the health of the President in case of serious 
illness is to guarantee such people’s right, contrary to secretive practice in totalitarian 
governments (J. Bernas, supra at pp. 750-1). 
 
 13
  Another limitation on the presidency is provided by Section 13 prohibiting the 
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from 
holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless allowed by the 
Constitution as when the Secretary of Justice sits as ex officio Chairman of the Judicial and 
Bar Council (CONST, art. VIII, sec. 8(1)) and the Vice-President is appointed as a member 
of the cabinet (CONST, art. VII, sec. 3, where such appointment needs no confirmation). 
The said section also prohibits the aforementioned officials from directly or indirectly 
practicing any other profession, participating in any business, or be financially interested in 
any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or 
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or 
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They are also enjoined to strictly avoid 
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The prohibition against participation in a 
contract with the government extends to a member of family corporation which has 
dealings with the government (Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 (1989) as cited 
in J. Bernas, supra at p. 756).  
 
 These prohibitions are in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust 
(CONST, art. XI, sec. 1) and should not be abused for personal advantage (I. Cruz, supra at 
p. 184). The purpose of the prohibitions is two-fold: (1) to avoid conflict of interest and (2) 
to force the officials to devote full time to their official duties (J. Bernas, supra at p. 756). 
The prohibitions also serve to discontinue the lucrative practice of Cabinet members 
occupying seats in the boards of directors of affluent corporations owned or controlled by 
the government from which they derived substantial income in addition to their regular 
salaries (I. Cruz, supra at p. 185). 
 
 The second paragraph of Section 13 also proscribes the appointment of the spouse 
and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President to 
be Members of Constitutional Commission, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as 
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including 
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision is 
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 intended as an anti-nepotism provision, previously prohibited only by statute (Pres. Decree 
No. 807, sec. 49 [1975]). 
 Perhaps the most significant limitation imposed on the President lies in the 
rewording of Section 18. This section, which contains the military power of the President, 
reposes tremendous and extraordinary authority in the President. As now worded, it 
provides: 
 
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed 
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such 
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case 
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not 
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the 
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the 
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. 
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in 
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which 
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the 
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or 
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or 
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. 
 
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such 
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need 
of a call. 
 
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any 
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the 
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must 
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. 
 
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor 
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or the legislative assemblies, nor 
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over 
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the 
privilege of the writ. 
 
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially 
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion. 
 
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or 
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. 
 15
  
 The military power enables the President to: (1) command all the armed forces of 
the Philippines and call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in cases of 
invasion or rebellion; (2) suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (3) declare 
martial law (I. Cruz, supra at p. 205). Under the 1987 Constitution, (1) the grounds for the 
imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are 
narrowed, (2) the discretion of the President is limited and it is put under review powers of 
both Congress and the Supreme Court, and (3) the bulk of the martial law jurisprudence 
that had developed under President Marcos was rejected (J. Bernas, supra at p. 802). More 
specifically the following significant changes in the original authority of the commander-
in-chief has been provided in the new Constitution (supra at p. 213): 
  
1. He may call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, 
invasion or rebellion only. 
2. The grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 
and the proclamation of martial law are now limited only to invasion or rebellion. 
3. The duration of such suspension or proclamation shall not exceed sixty days, 
following which it shall be automatically lifted. 
4. Within forty-eight hours after such suspension or proclamation, the 
President shall personally or in writing report his action to the Congress. If not in 
session, Congress must convene within 24 hours. 
5. The Congress may then, by a majority vote of all its members voting jointly, 
revoke his action. The revocation may not be set aside by the President. 
6. By the same vote and in the same manner, the Congress may, upon initiative 
of the President, extend the suspension or proclamation for a period to be 
determined by the Congress if the invasion or rebellion shall continue and the public 
safety requires the extension. 
7. The action of the President and the Congress shall be subject to review by 
the Supreme Court which shall have the authority to determine the sufficiency of 
the factual basis of such action. This matter is no longer considered a political 
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 question and may be raised in an appropriate proceeding by any citizen. Moreover, 
the Supreme Court must decide the challenge within thirty days from the time it is 
filed. 
8. Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus or the operation of the Constitution. The civil courts and the 
legislative bodies shall remain open. Military courts and agencies are not conferred 
jurisdiction over civilians where the civil courts are functioning. 
9. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only 
to persons facing charges of rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected 
with invasion. 
10. Any person arrested for such offense must be judicially charged therewith 
within three days. Otherwise, he shall be released. 
 
The rule that military courts do not supplant the civil courts adopts the “open court” 
rule in Duncan v. Kahanamoku (327 U.S. 304 [1946]) and rejects the contrary rule first 
enunciated in Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2 (63 SCRA 546 [1975]). In the latter 
case the Supreme Court ruled that Presidential Decree No. 39 issued by President Marcos 
providing for the "Rules Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure and 
Other Matters Relevant to Military Tribunals" which in turn vested military tribunals with 
jurisdiction "exclusive of the civil courts", among others, over crimes against public order, 
violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, violations of the laws on firearms, and other crimes 
which, in the face of the emergency, are directly related to the quelling of the rebellion and 
preservation of the safety and security of the Republic, were within the President’s 
authority to promulgate, since it is recognized that the incumbent President, under 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 3 of Article XVII of the new Constitution, had the authority 
to promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the period of martial law.     
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 III. The Judicial Department 
The role of the judiciary in a democracy is best summed up as follows (I. Cruz, 
supra at p. 228): 
 
 “Although holding neither purse nor sword, the judiciary is an indispensable 
department of every democratic government. It is trite to say that courts of justice 
are the bastion of the rights and liberties of the people. Nevertheless, it cannot be 
repeated too often that the lifeblood of every libertarian regime is found in the 
vitality of its judicial system. 
  
Timid and corrupt judges will sap the vigor of popular government; on the other 
hand, a free and fearless judiciary will give it strength, endurance and stability. 
There is no doubt that the success of the Republic will depend, in the last analysis, 
upon the effectiveness of the courts in upholding the majesty of justice and the 
principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men. 
  
Lacking this capacity, judges become no more than lackeys of the political 
departments cowed to do their bidding or instruments of their own interests 
scheming for self-aggrandizement. Without independence and integrity, courts will 
lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of 
justice.” 
  
 Cognizant of the important role of the judiciary in a tripartite system of democratic 
government, the 1987 Constitution introduced provisions aimed at strengthening the 
independence of the judiciary vis-à-vis the legislative and the executive departments who 
hold the powers of the purse and the sword, respectively. 
 
 Foremost of the changes introduced by the new Constitution in the judicial 
department is the addition to the judicial power of the determination of grave abuse of 
discretion. As now worded, Section 1 of Article VIII provides: 
 
 The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower 
courts as may be established by law. 
  
 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual 
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to 
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to 
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 lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the 
Government. 
 
 The first part of the definition of judicial power represents the traditional concept of 
judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The 
second part represents a broadening of judicial power enabling courts of justice to review 
what previously was forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments 
of the government (Ibid at p. 232). Of course, while this addition was introduced due to the 
frequency the Supreme Court resorts to the political question doctrine during the period of 
martial law this provision does not do away with the doctrine (J. Bernas, supra at p. 831). 
When a case refers to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the 
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has 
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government, then it is a 
political question and the courts will not take cognizance of the case (Tañada v. Cuenco, 
103 Phil. 1051 [1957]). 
 
 Moreover, not every abuse of discretion can be reviewed by the courts. It has to be a 
grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and 
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of 
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual 
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where 
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility 
(Sinon v. Civil Service Commission, 215 SCRA 410 [1992]).      
 While Section 2 grants the authority to Congress to define, prescribe, and apportion 
the jurisdiction of various courts, it cannot deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction 
over cases enumerated in Section 5. This section provides: 
 
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 
 
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other 
public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, 
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. 
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 (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the 
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: 
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, 
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, 
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. 
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or 
any penalty imposed in relation thereto. 
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. 
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or 
higher. 
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. 
 
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public 
interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without 
the consent of the judge concerned. 
 
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 
 
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of 
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to 
the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. 
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy 
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not 
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts 
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme 
Court. 
 
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with 
the Civil Service Law. 
  
Corollarily, it cannot pass a law increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court without its advice and concurrence (CONST, art. VI, sec. 30). As the authority to 
create lower courts also includes the authority to abolish courts, Congress cannot do the 
latter as a subterfuge for removing unwanted judges. Section 2 also provides that no law 
shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of the 
members of the judiciary. 
 
 One of the more important provisions of the 1987 Constitution to ensure the 
independence of the judiciary is the grant of fiscal autonomy. Section 3 of Article VIII 
states that “(T)he Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary 
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 may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year 
and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. This provision is 
principally intended to remove the courts from the mercy and caprice, not to say 
vindictiveness, of the legislature when it considers the general appropriations bill (I. Cruz, 
supra at p. 237). The Supreme Court explained fiscal autonomy in the case of Bengzon v. 
Drilon (208 SCRA 133 [1992]) thus: 
 
“As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, 
the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on 
Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full 
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that 
their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect 
fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for 
compensation and play plans of the government and allocate and disburse such 
sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the 
discharge of their functions. 
 
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court 
says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends 
its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given 
by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude. 
 
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have 
the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional 
duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent 
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations 
is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the 
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and 
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is 
based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional 
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant 
reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should 
cease to be a meaningless provision.”  
 
 Finally, to remove as much as possible the influence of partisan politics in the 
matter of judicial appointments owing to the unfortunate experience in the past when 
persons without credentials except their political affiliation and loyalty were able to 
infiltrate and deteriorate the judiciary (I. Cruz, supra at p. 235), the 1987 Constitution 
introduced an innovation by the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council, which takes the 
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 place of the Commission on Appointments in matters of judicial appointments. This is a 
response to the suggestion of practicing lawyers because in the past [when appointment of 
judges had to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments] judges had to kowtow to 
members of the legislative body to get an appointment or at least to see the Chairman of the 
Committee on the Judiciary in Congress and request support for the confirmation of their 
appointment (J. Bernas, supra at p. 881). The Council recommends to the President 
appointees to the Judiciary, and from these nominees the President appoints the judges 
without need for confirmation by a Commission on Appointments (Ibid). Article VIII 
provides: 
 
SECTION 8. (1)  A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the 
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio 
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex 
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired 
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. 
 
(2)  The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for 
a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the 
Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four 
years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the 
representative of the private sector for one year. 
 
(3)  The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the 
Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings. 
 
(4)   The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may 
be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual 
budget the appropriations for the Council. 
 
(5)   The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees 
to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme 
Court may assign to it. 
 
While the judges appointed by the President from those nominated by the Judicial 
and Bar Council need no confirmation from the Commission on Appointments, it is readily 
seen that the appointment of the regular members of the Council are still subject to the 
consent of the Commission on Appointment (CONST, art. VIII, sec. 8(2)). This provision 
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 allows a political check on the President’s appointing authority which otherwise would be 
the sole political influence on judicial appointments (J. Bernas, supra at pp. 881-2). 
 
 The appointment of judges should also be in consonance with Section 12, providing 
that “(T)he Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not 
be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.” Judges 
may not be appointed in an acting or temporary capacity as this undermines the 
independence of the judiciary, as temporary appointments are essentially revocable at will 
(I. Cruz, supra at p. 237).  
 
Summary 
As a reaction to the abuse of executive power by the former President Marcos, the 
1987 Constitution added new provisions to both the Legislative and Judicial Departments 
as checks to executive power, knowing fully well the vastness of the plenary executive 
power reposed in only one person, the President, in contrast to the collegial bodies in the 
two other departments. Thus, the 1987 Constitution recognized once more Congress as the 
repository of democracy and has expanded the scope of judicial power to check on any 
governmental act as to grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the 1987 Constitution has also 
limited the powers of the President by imposing express constitutional limitations, as for 
instance on the martial law powers in Sec. 18 of Article VII. 
 
But perhaps the more significant additions in the 1987 Constitution in terms of 
democratizing governmental powers are the provisions allowing for direct people 
participation. While the structure of government in the Philippines is that of representative 
democracy, still, the people, from which all governmental authority emanate, must be able 
to exercise direct participation in governance to emphasize their significance in the 
country’s development. The people have been given the power to amend the Constitution 
or any statutory enactment for that matter, question the sufficiency of the factual basis of 
the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, or form party-
list groups to run for Congress in the case of sectoral groups.  
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 However, while the 1987 Constitution has expressly placed new provisions aimed 
at democratization, it remains to be seen how the intent to democratize by the framers of 
the 1987 Constitution will be carried out. Congress has to pass the essential adequate 
enabling law to allow the people to amend the Constitution and the people have to be 
conscious of their increasing role in expressing their collective will, including participation 
through voting of party-list representatives. Only then can it be said that the 1987 
Constitution has successfully democratized governmental powers.       
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